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Liberalism and Capabilities: Theories of Justice 
and the Neutral State 
Percy B. Lehning 1 
Modem liberal theories hare the idea that the state and its laws should remain 
neutral with respect o the varying conceptions of the good life held by indi- 
viduals. This article discusses the way in which this notion of neutrality is de- 
fined and justified. Rawls's theory of justice is shown to be a prime example 
of such a theory. Questions are raised, however, if Rawls's theory has ade- 
quately formulated the conditions that would make it possible for each citizen 
to fulfill his own conception of the good. After arguing that Dworkin's olution 
to this problem is also problematic, it is argued that Sen's solution to the ques- 
tion of what conditions create neutrality shows the way ahead. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Discussions of what is required for a liberal political order have re- 
cently acquired a new impetus. Questions as to what the main features of 
a constitutional regime should be or, more generally, what the role of the 
state should be are hotly discussed. In this article the answers given by 
modern liberal theorists are discussed. 
Modern liberal theories typically begin with an analysis of one claim: 
In a liberal political order, political principles are to be neutral. Stated 
more precisely, it is the principle that the state and its laws should remain 
neutral with respect o the varying conceptions of the good life held by 
individuals. This principle of neutrality is recognized to be an important 
aspect of liberalism because it enables individuals to have the freedom to 
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choose between alternative conceptions of the good life. The importance 
of this principle in liberal theory is recognized by many different heorists 
such as Ackerman (1980), Alexander and Schwarzschild (1987), Barry 
(1990a, 1990b) Dworkin (1978, 1983), Galston (1982), Larmore (1987), 
Rawls (1971, 1987, 1988, 1989), Raz (1986), and Sandel (1982). Some theo- 
rists, for instance, Larmore and Rawls, are staunch defenders of the 
principle of neutrality. 2 Others, for example, Galston, Raz, Sandel, and Al- 
exander and Schwarzschild, reject the principle for a variety of reasons. 
The structure of this article is as follows: First the question is dis- 
cussed of how the liberal notion of neutrality of the state is to be defined 
and why it should be defended at all. In this context, a relation between 
the ideas of a neutral state and freedom of choice is demonstrated. An 
example of a theory that specifies and defends a doctrine of political neu- 
trality is presented: Rawls's political conception of justice. Criticisms 
advanced against he liberal principle of neutrality are dealt with. These 
kinds of criticism are illustrated by Raz's critique and Sandel's communi- 
tarian critique. 
Then, the question is raised as to how the state could create condi- 
tions that make it possible for citizens to have the opportunity to choose 
between different conceptions of the good. The solutions presented by 
Rawls and Dworkin raise many problems. It is argued that Sen's alternative 
answer to this question is more satisfactory. The conclusion of this article 
is that a liberal political order can exist only if it is based on the principle 
of neutrality of the state. 
POLITICAL NEUTRALITY AND FREEDOM 
The central argument favoring the liberal notion of neutrality is that 
it is necessary if one acknowledges that there exist a variety of conceptions 
of the good life. There are many ways in which a fulfilled life can be lived, 
without any perceptible hierarchy among them. As Larmore has formulated 
it in his defense of neutrality in modem liberal societies, pluralism and rea- 
sonable disagreement have become for modem thought ineliminable f atures 
of the idea of the good life (Larmore, 1987, p. 23). (See Appendix A.) 
In response to pluralism and reasonable disagreement, political lib- 
eralism formulates the principle that the state should be neutral. 
2Larmore's Patterns of Moral Complexity (1987) gives the most elaborate d fense of political 
neutrality presently available. The article, especially the general ideas on neutrality, owes a 
lot to the ideas formulated in that book. 
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The state should not seek to promote any particular conception of the good life 
because of its presumed intrinsic superiority--that is, because it is supposedly a 
truer conception. (Larmore, 1987, p. 43) 
And Raz (1986), who interprets this neutral political concern as an anti- 
perfectionist principle, suggests that this principle 
claims that implementation and promotion ofideals of the good life, though worthy 
in themselves, are not a legitimate matter for governmental action. The doctrine 
of political neutrality seeks to implement it through apolicy of neutrality. Govern- 
ment action should be neutral regarding ideals of the good life. (p. 110) 
Neutrality is seen as a political ideal, it governs a state's policies and in- 
stitutions, the public relations between persons and the state, and not the 
private relations between persons and other institutions. Liberalism is in 
this view not seen as a philosophy of man, but as a philosophy of politics 
(Larmore, 1987, p. 129). (As shown in the next section, Rawls, 1985, 1987, 
1988, 1989, defends the same position.) 
Now the liberal idea of neutral political order can be understood in 
two different ways, as De Marneffe has argued. The first idea can be called 
constitutional neutrality: "a system of laws is neutral if, as a whole, it can 
be justified solely in terms of neutral values" (1989, pp. 52-53; 1990, p. 
259). The second idea is legislative neutrality: "a system of laws is neutral 
when there is no law which cannot itself be justified in terms of neutral 
values (or: for every law, there is a neutral reason which warrants it) (1989, 
p. 53; 1990, p. 259). In this article we are concerned with constitutional 
neutrality: Each citizen has sufficient reason to accept he basic social and 
political institutions of his society because those institutions are neutral be- 
tween conceptions of the good, in the sense that they are acceptable to 
reasonable citizens who hold different particular conceptions of the good. 
An implication of political neutrality, in this sense, is that there is a 
constraint on the factors that can be invoked to justify political values. Con- 
stitutional decision making can count as neutral only if it can be justified 
without appealing to the presumed intrinsic superiority of any particular 
conception of the good life (Larmore, 1987, p. 44). The justification of 
constitutional neutrality is based on the wish to show everyone qual con- 
cern and respect. Other persons are due equal respect by virtue of their 
capacity to work out their own conception of the good life (Larmore, 1987, 
pp. 59-66; Dworkin, 1977, pp. 180, 272; 1978, p. 127; Raz, 1986, p. 220). 
The stress upon neutrality and equal respect, which denies the state 
any right to implement any specific conception of the good life, emphasizes 
the equal freedom that all persons should have to pursue their own con- 
ception of the good life. As Raz (1986), for instance, formulated it: "The 
conflict in which the state is supposed to be neutral is about the ability of 
people to choose and successfully pursue conceptions of the good" (p. 123). 
190 Lehning 
With this conception of neutrality, the state can be neutral only, according 
to Raz "if it creates conditions of equal opportunities for people to choose 
any conception of the good, with an equal prospect of realizing it" (p. 124). 
So equal freedom of choice and political neutrality necessarily go hand in 
hand, according to this argument. Now Raz's formulation of "neutrality" 
as the equal prospect of realizing one's conception of the good is a rather 
strong one. I do not want to elaborate on this point here but simply assume 
that we are talking about a reasonable opportunity for each citizen to realize 
his conception of the good. Or, following Rawls's (1988, p. 262) formulation 
of neutrality as an aim of the state, we understand it to mean that the 
state ensures for all citizens equal opportunity to advance any permissible 
conception of the good, namely, those conceptions that respect he princi- 
ple of "justice as fairness." 
To be more precise, in this article we opt for a "comprehensive prin- 
ciple of neutrality," defined by Raz (1986) in the following way: 
One of the main goals of governmental authority, which is lexical prior to any other, 
is to ensure for all persons an equal ability to pursue in their lives and promote 
in their societies any ideal of the good of their choosing. (p. 115) 
(Raz (1986) himself rejects not only this principle of neutrality but all prin- 
ciples of neutrality, in line with his defense of perfectionism. See section 
"The Liberal Critique of Neutrality: Raz.") In what follows, political neu- 
trality is understood in this way. 
Recapitulating: We have seen that liberalism is defined as a theory 
in which one of the main values of the political order--political justice--is 
defined by the neutrality of the state. The fundamental political principles, 
by which all individuals are to live, must be justified without appeal to the 
intrinsic superiority of any conception of the good. Such principles assign 
to persons rights and duties and define the appropriate distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation. These principles are the prin- 
ciples of social justice. They are liberal principles because they take a 
neutral stand with regard to different conceptions of the good (Rawls, 1971, 
p. 4). 
Rawls's theory of justice is the prime example of a theory that de- 
velops such principles. It is to this theory that we now turn. 
POLITICAL NEUTRALITY AND RAWLS'S THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 
Without any doubt the richest and most serious attempt o specify 
and defend a doctrine of political neutrality is the one formulated by Rawls. 
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In particular his articles published since his Dewey Lectures make his po- 
sition in the "neutrality debate" very clear (Rawls, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1988, 
1989). I concentrate on recent publications of Rawls, such as "The Idea 
of an Overlapping Consensus" (t987) and "The Priority of Right and Ideas 
of the Good" (1988). One could argue that while A Theory of Justice (1971) 
was harboring, side by side, a Kantian approach and a political conception 
of justice, in Rawls's more recent articles (especially the one's published 
in 1985, 1987, 1988, and 1989), Justice as fairness is distinctly seen as a 
political conception of justice that reflects the "working out" (not the "ap- 
plication") of a moral conception. In other words, since 1985, RaMs has 
clarified the political dimensions of justice as fairness to emphasize the 
political, as opposed to the metaphysical, foundations of his theory. (See 
also Wallach, 1987, pp. 582-583, on the development in Rawls's theory, as 
can be deduced from RaMs, 1982, 1985, 1987.) The moral subject of his 
theory is now quite dearly the citizen. Before we elaborate on Rawls's re- 
cent views however, a few preliminary remarks are made that will be of 
use in the following argument. 
Larmore has distinguished two different views of the relation between 
the political order and ideals of the person. The first is the modus vivendi 
perspective, the second the expressivist one (Larmore, 1987, pp. 74, 91)o 
The first view is the one in which the political order is seen as predomi- 
nantly a modus vivendi, a means of accommodation among individuals 
having divergent conceptions of the good life. Political neutrality is in this 
case the primary political ideal, although it implies no repudiation or less- 
ening of attachment to substantive conceptions of the good life one may 
have outside the political realm, in one's personal ideals. 
The second view (Larmore, 1987), opposed to the first one, is expres- 
sivism: "It requires that the political order express our personal ideal, in 
the sense that its highest ideal must mirror or coincide with what are in 
general our deepest commitments" (p. 91). In recent articles, RaMs dearly 
rejects this expressivist view. At the same time he makes clear in his elabo- 
ration of his political conception of justice that his interpretation of 
liberalism differentiates between personal and political ideals, between 
homme and citoyen. His theory should be interpreted as a theory about 
citoyen. 
In "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus" Rawls (1987) articulates 
three features of a political conception of justice. The first constitutes the 
substantive principles of justice, worked out to apply to the basic structure 
of a modern constitutional democracy. The second feature complements 
the first and is the most important in respect of our present discussion° 
[A] political conception is not to be understood as a general and comprehensive 
morn  conception that pplies to the political order, as if this order was only another 
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subject, another kind of case, falling under that conception. Thus, a political con- 
ception of justice is different from many familiar moral doctrines, for these are 
widely understood as general and comprehensive iews. Perfectionism and utilitari- 
anism are clear examples, since the principles of perfection and utility are thought 
to apply to all kinds of subjects ranging from the conduct of individuals and personal 
relations to the organization of society as a whole, and even to the law of nations. 
. . . By contrast, a political conception of justice involves, so far as possible, no 
prior commitment to any wider doctrine. It looks initially to the basic structure and 
tries to elaborate a reasonable conception f r that structure alone. (pp. 3-4) 
One reason for this focus on a political conception for the basic structure 
is that, as a practical matter, no general and comprehensive iew can pro- 
vide a publicly acceptable basis for a political conception of justice. So, the 
political conception of justice must allow for a diversity of general and com- 
prehensive doctrines, and for the plurality of conflicting and indeed incom- 
mensurable conceptions of the good (Rawls, 1971, p. 94; 1987). This 
diversity of doctrines, this political fact of pluralism is, according to Rawls, 
a permanent feature of the public culture of modem society, so that one 
has to look for a basis of agreement o her than that of a general and com- 
prehensive doctrine. The task then becomes to look for a political concep- 
tion of justice that might be supported by an overlapping consensus) 
The importance of the second feature of a political conception of 
justice should not be underestimated, specially in regard to Rawls's earlier 
position as formulated in A Theory of Justice. The second feature denies 
not only that general and comprehensive doctrines might give a basis for 
a shared view but also for many forms of liberalism. 
Although any workable conception of political justice must be "lib- 
eral" this will not be, according to Rawls (1987, p. 5), the liberalism of 
Kant or Mill. (See also Nagel, 1987, for a discussion on the aspect of lib- 
eralism depending on the acceptance of a higher order impartiality and 
the problems uch a defense raises.) The public role of a neutrally recog- 
nized political conception of justice is to specify a point of view from which 
all citizens can examine before one another whether or not their political 
institutions are just. 
sit should be made clear that Rawls makes a distinction between an overlapping consensus 
and a modus vivendi. An overlapping consensus i not the same as a modus vivendi because 
the first is connected with stability. An overlapping consensus i independent of shifts in the 
distribution of power, while in Rawls's view the stability of a modus vivendi depends on 
happenstance and a balance of relative forces (1987, p. 11). As we have seen earlier Larmore 
makes a distinction between a modus vivendi view and the expressivist one. In Larmore's 
modus vivendi view there is (partial) agreement on grounds that neither implies nor 
automatically produces an agreement on political principles. In Rawls's idea of an overlapping 
consensus there is normative agreement on political principles but not on the grounds that 
justify them. (See Richardson, 1990, lap. 9-11, for a helpful clarification of the different 
configurations that are the result of the facts of pluralism.) In this article, I understand the 
term "modus vivendi" to have the same meaning as the term "overlapping consensus." 
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It enables them to do this by citing what are recognized among them as valid and 
sufficient reasons ingled out by that conception itself. Questions of political justice 
can be discussed on the same basis by all citizens, whatever their social position, 
or more particular aims and interests, or their religious, philosophical or moral 
views . . . .  Given the fact of pluralism, and given that justification begins from some 
consensus, no general and comprehensive doctrine can assume the role of a publicly 
acceptable basis of political justice. (Rawls, 1987, p. 6) 
This conclusion makes it clear what are the problematic aspects of the lib- 
eralism of Kant and Mill. Both are general and comprehensive moral doc- 
trines, they comprehend far more than the political. 
Their doctrines of free institutions rest in large part on ideals and values that are 
not generally, or perhaps even widely, shared in a democratic society. They are not 
a practicable public basis of a political conception of justice. (Rawls, 1987, p. 6) 4 
This leads to the third feature of a political conception of justice, namely, 
that the political conception is not formulated in terms of a general and 
comprehensive r ligious, philosophical, or moral doctrine but rather "in 
terms of certain fundamental intuitive ideas viewed as latent in the public 
political culture of a democratic society" (Rawls, 1987, p. 6). 
Now, of course, the political conception of justice Rawls has in mind 
is his own conception: "justice as fairness." Another example of a political 
conception of justice is Dworkin's (1978, 1981a, 198tb, 1983) liberal con- 
ception of equality. 
Justice as fairness is intended to solve the fundamental question of 
political justice, namely, what is the most appropriate conception of justice 
for specifying the terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as 
free and equal persons (Rawls, 1985, p. 234; 1987, p. 7). 
Citizens are free in that they conceive of themselves and others as 
having a conception of the good, independent of any particular conception 
of the good, or scheme of final ends. They are also free in that they view 
themselves as self-originating sources of valid claims. Third, they are free 
in the sense that they are capable of taking responsibility for their ends 
and this affects how their various claims are assessed (Rawls, 1985, pp. 
239-244). 
Thus, to recapitulate, we have se n that liberalism is understood by 
Rawls to be a political doctrine, which supposes that there are many con- 
flicting conceptions of the good. Such a diversity of conceptions makes it 
necessary to search for a political conception of justice that will regulate 
the terms of social cooperation between citizens in such a way that each 
person will have the equal ability to pursue in the "nonpublic" sphere the 
ideal of the good of his own choosing. 
4See also Rawls (1985, pp. 245-248; 1988, pp. 267-268). 
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One can conclude that Rawls's recent articles formulate and defend 
an unequivocal plea for the comprehensive principle of neutrality with the 
intention of guaranteeing each person the equal freedom of choice of his 
conception of the good. (See also Rawls, 1988, p. 262. He there draws on 
Raz's formulation of three versions of neutrality. Justice as fairness atisfies, 
according to Rawls the "comprehensive principle of neutrality".) 
POLITICAL NEUTRALITY AND SOME CRITICS 
The Communitarian Critique of Neutrality: Sandel 
The core of the communitarian critique against he liberal principle 
of neutrality rejects the idea that the political order should remain neutral 
toward different ideals of happiness and self-realization, toward different 
conceptions of the good. 5 Larmore (1987) has summarized this communi- 
tarian position in the following way: 
Because no one can determine with full autonomy how he shall see the world and 
what goals he shall pursue, but instead can come to understand himself only through 
participating in shared traditions and social forms--because in some areas he should 
not even strive for autonomy, the primary role of the state must be not to sustain 
a kind of neutrality, but rather to embody and foster some particular conception 
of the good life. (p. 92) 
In communitarianism the relation between the political order and ideals 
of the person is understood in terms of what has earlier been described as 
expressivism. It demands, in general, that our personal ideal should be mir- 
rored in our highest political ideal, that is, the political ideal should mirror 
our ideal of what should have paramount importance in our lives. In the 
communitarian view, expressivism is connected with the nonliberal view 
that the state must foster some substantial ideal of the good life in its citi- 
zens. Community should fulfill a common purpose. 
A typical example of this line of reasoning is to be found in Sandel's 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982). 6According to Sandel, the main 
problem with liberalism is that its foundations are faulty: To achieve ab- 
5For an overview and a discussion of the recent communitarian literature see: Wallach (1987); 
Gutmann (1985); Taylor (1989); Thigpen and Downing (1987). See also for a critique of 
recent objections and misinterpretations formulated by communitarians like Sandel, 
Maclntyre, and Rorty against the antiperfectionism of liberals like Rawls and Dworkin: 
Kymlicka (1988). In this article I discuss only what is called "teleological communitarianism" 
as formulated by, for instance, Sandel and Maclntyre. I do not elaborate on nonteleological 
communitarian ideas, as formulated by, for instance, Rorty (1988). 
6For discussion and critique of Sandel (1982): see Larmore (1987, pp. 121-129); Gutmann 
(1985, pp. 310-314); Wallach (1987, pp. 591-596); Taylor (1989). 
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solute priority for principles of justice, liberals must hold a set of implau- 
sible metaphysical views about the self. They cannot admit, Sandel remarks 
that, for example, our personal identities are partly defined by our com- 
munal attachments. 
Sandel places Rawls's theory of justice at the center of his critique. 
He charges Rawls with failing to appreciate the constitutive character of 
the self because the moral subject of justice as fairness may not be iden- 
tified by his or her constitutive attachments. The distinction that we noted 
earlier in Rawls between public and private realms is consequently attacked 
by Sandel, who correctly understands that Rawls's political theory belongs 
to the great liberal tradition. It locates the primary ideal of the political 
order in the neutrality of the state and so in an "abstract" conception of 
justice. The distribution of political and economic benefits is to be regu- 
lated by principles that do not presuppose, for their justification, any 
particular conception of the good life. In this sense the right is prior to 
the good. Sandel's critique of Rawls's theory centers around the Kantian 
form of justification that, he argues, dominates Rawls's work. This Kantian 
base can justify the primacy of abstract justice only by appealing to an ideal 
of the person as disencumbered of natural and social circumstances and 
so prior to its ends and values. For Sandel this ideal of an "disencumbered- 
self" is totally unacceptable. 
Sandel's tarting point is an expressivist model of the political order. 
The only condition under which an ideal of what we should be as persons 
can be connected with a conception of the political order is when this idea 
is expressed in the primary ideals of that order. Once we recognize that 
our personhood must be constituted in part by a commitment to some con- 
ception of the good life, Sandel (1982, pp. 179-183) argues, we will grasp 
that the political order too, must subordinate justice to that higher, more 
substantive ideal. Thus, Sandel forces us to choose in favor of one sort of 
expressivism, some form of communitarianism. 
However, nowhere does Sandel consider the alternative that Larmore 
called the modus vivendi view, a view that RaMs has elaborated on in his 
articles published since the Dewey Lectures. In these articles there is, as 
mentioned earlier, a sharp distinction between how we understand our- 
selves as citizens within the political system and how we may regard 
ourselves in our personal affairs or within certain intermediate associations, 
(See Appendix B.) 
Once again, it should be stressed, that the modus vivendi requires 
only in the political domain to abstract from particular, controversial con- 
ceptions of the good life. We should not abstract from our shared interests: 
for instance, in the way that we value the freedom to choose a good life 
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or the freedom at least from having a particular form of life imposed upon 
us by political authorities. 
Rawls himself (1987) has reacted to the objections from the commu- 
nitarian perspective: 
Note that what is impracticable is not all values of community (recall that a com- 
munity is understood as an association or society whose unity rests on a compre- 
hensive conception of the good) but only political community and its values. Justice 
as fairness assumes, as other political views do also, that the values of community 
are not only essential but realizable, first in the various associations that extend 
across the boundaries of nation-states, such as churches and scientific societies. Lib- 
eralism rejects the state as a community because, among other things, it leads to 
the systematic denial of basic liberties and to the oppressive use of the state's mo- 
nopoly of (legal) force. (p. 10, note 17) 7 
Liberalism does not, as is clear from the comments by Rawls and Larmore, 
presuppose metaphysics. As Gutmann (1985) has summarized: 
The major aim of liberal justice is to find principles appropriate for a society in 
which people disagree fundamentally over many questions, including such meta- 
physical questions as the nature of personal identity. Liberal justice therefore does 
not provide us with a comprehensive morality; it regulates our social institutions, 
not our entire lives. It makes claims on us "not because it expresses our deepest 
self-understanding", butbecause it represents he fairest possible modus vivendi for 
a pluralistic society. (p. 313) 
The equal ability to pursue in one's life an ideal of the good of one's 
own choosing, this idea of the freedom of choice, implies the rejection of 
the idea that the state should or could be seen as a community, defined 
by a substantive ideal. This idea of freedom of choice does not, one should 
stress, reject he importance of the idea of "belonging," but it does, indeed, 
reject Sanders suggestion that we should give up the "politics of rights" 
for a "politics of the common good." (See also Larmore, 1987, p. 119, for 
stressing the importance of "belonging." Sanders uggestion for a politics 
of the common good is to be found in Sandel, 1984, p. 17.) 
Our conclusion is that the comprehensive principle of neutrality 
should strongly be defended against he communitarian attacks as formu- 
lated by Sandel. 
The Liberal Critique of Neutrality: Raz 
As we have seen the doctrine of neutrality between conceptions of 
the good follows from moral pluralism. In his critique of Rawlsian antiper- 
fectionism, and in the course of his defense of his own version of 
perfectionism as developed in The Morality of Freedom, Raz (1986) makes 
7For a direct reaction by Rawls on Sandel: see Rawls (1985, p. 239, note 21). 
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the following remark: "Moral pluralism is often thought to necessitate neu- 
tral political concern" (p. 133). However, he wants to make clear that there 
is a logical gap between pluralism and neutrality. No one would, it seems 
to me, deny this point. The importance of this remark becomes clear when 
one realizes that Raz (1987) takes a position in which moral pluralism and 
neutrality do not, in fact, go together. The disjunction arises because Raz 
explores: 
the rationality of perfectionist moral pluralism, i.e. of pluralism of many forms of 
the good which are admitted to be so many valuable xpressions of people's nature, 
but pluralism which allows that certain conceptions of the good are worthless and 
demeaning, and that political action may and should be taken to eradicate or at 
least curtail them. (p. 133) 
Disregarding for the moment the fact that Raz is evidently not talking 
about full moral pluralism, but about pluralism to a certain degree ("certain 
conceptions of the good are worthless and demeaning," those must be "cur- 
tailed"), his argument on moral pluralism continues as follows: 
Moral pluralism asserts the existence of a multitude of incompatible but morally 
valuable forms of life. It is coupled with an advocacy of autonomy. It naturally 
combines with e view that individuals hould develop freely to find for themselves 
the form of the good which they wish to pursue in their life. Both combined lead 
to political conclusions which are in some way akin to those of Rawls: political 
action should be concerned with providing individuals with the means by which 
they can develop, which enables them to choose and attempt o realize their own 
conception of the good. (p. 133) 
One may wonder then what the difference is between the antiperfectionism 
of Rawls and the perfectionism Raz is defending. 8 That difference is, ac- 
cording to Raz (1986), that "there is nothing here which speaks for neu- 
trality. For it is the goal of all political action to enable individuals to 
pursue valid conceptions of the good and to discourage evil or empty ones" 
(p. 133). So we see that Raz's perfectionism is, in fact, stronger than his 
interpretation of moral pluralism on first sight seemed to be. Moral plu- 
ralism or not, some conceptions of the good are not valid and should be 
prevented from being realized. Neutrality should not prevail in all situ- 
ations. This position becomes even more clear when Raz brings in the state. 
He "maintains that it is the function of government to promote morality. 
That means that government should promote the moral quality of life of 
those whose lives and activities they can affect" (po 415). And further on: 
8Rawls himself (1988) also notes that there is "some resemblance between the values of 
political liberalism and the values of the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill" (p. 
268). And in a footnote Rawls adds: "And that of Raz in 'The Morality of Freedom'" (p. 
268, note 26). The main point is, however, "to set out carefully the great differences in both 
scope and generality between political and comprehensive liberalism" (p. 268; italics added). 
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the autonomy principle is a perfectionist principle. Autonomous life is valuable only 
if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and valuable projects and relationships. 
The autonomy principle permits and even requires governments o create morally 
valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones. (p. 417). 
Raz defends this position against he antiperfectionist view in the following 
way: 
The most deeply rooted confusion leading to the intuitive appeal of the anti-per- 
fectionist is the thought hat anti-perfectionism is necessary to prevent people from 
imposing their favored style of life on others . . . .  This need not be the case . . . .  
If a plurality of incompatible, ven rival, forms of life is valuable then perfectionism 
would not lead to the suppression of forms of life which are not practiced by those 
in power. (pp. 161-162) 
Raz, in other words, argues that pluralism is compatible with perfectionism 
but incompatible with neutrality. He denies that an endorsement of moral 
pluralism implies a commitment to political and public neutrality. Moral 
pluralism is defined by Raz as the view that there are many genuinely con- 
flicting forms of the good life and that none of these competing forms of 
life have a claim to be publicly entrenched relative to another. This does 
not, however, imply neutrality because some (perhaps all) of them have a 
claim to be entrenched in public life relative to some other forms of life. 
This is because many valuable forms of life require certain public goods, 
for example, a culture of toleration, which is incompatible with these latter 
forms of life. And this is why pluralism is compatible with perfectionism 
but incompatible with neutrality. While defending perfectionism, Raz ar- 
gues that governments should defend "valid" conceptions of the good and 
prevent "evil ones." The consequence of the application of this doctrine 
of Raz might be that it leads to the imposition by the powerful of their 
way of life. For that reason one should prefer, I think, a doctrine of anti- 
perfectionism, which is based on a concern for the dignity and integrity of 
individuals and on a revulsion from letting one section of the community 
impose its favored way of life on the rest. (And this is recognized by Raz 
himself to be the core of the antiperfectionist position.) 9 
Although, in my view, this would in itself be enough reason to con- 
tinue to defend "the comprehensive principle of neutrality" against Raz's 
perfectionism, there is another point that should be made clear in regard 
to Raz's interpretation of an antiperfectionism like that of Rawls. From 
9See Raz (1986, p. 162). Nevertheless, Raz (1986) defends and compares his own perfectionism 
even with communitarian doctrines: "Its perfectionist character, he rejection of moral 
individualism, and the emphasis placed on the importance of collective goods bring the view 
here advocated close to various collectivist, or communitarian doctrines" (p. 426). These 
remarks make it even more clear why Raz's perfectionism should be rejected in the context 
of our discussion of neutrality. (I am grateful to Albert Weale for clarifying for me Raz's 
position on pluralism and perfectionism.) 
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Raz's rejection of it, one gets the impression that antiperfectionism is seen 
by him as a vision in which "anything oes." Or, as Raz says: "Anti-per- 
fectionism in practice would lead not merely to a political stand-off rom 
support for valuable conceptions of the good. It would undermine the 
chances of survival of many cherished aspects of our culture" (p. 162). If 
the comprehensive principle of neutrality is seen as an antiperfectionist 
principle, as it is by Raz, then this interpretation of antiperfectionism is 
much too "strong." As stated earlier, the doctrine that the state should 
be neutral means that it should not seek to promote any particular con- 
ception of the good life because of its presumed intrinsic superiority, that 
is, because it is supposedly a truer conception (Larmore, 1987, p. 43). 
However this certainly does not mean, as Raz seems to imply in the state- 
ment quoted above, that the state should "stand-off" completely. It may, 
of course, restrict certain ideals for extrinsic reasons (e.g., those that 
threaten the lives of others). In that sense one could speak of a "qualified" 
antiperfectionism. 
Political neutrality is, as Larmore (1987) has remarked, a relative mat- 
ter: 
It does not require that the state be neutral with respect o all conceptions of the 
good life, but only with respect o those actually disputed in the society. Where 
everyone agrees about some element of human flourishing, the liberal should have 
no reason to deny it a role in shaping political principles. (p. 67). 
We conclude that Raz has failed to demonstrate hat one should abandon 
the comprehensive principle of neutrality, and that the critique of the neu- 
trality principle has, so far, proved unconvincing. 
LIBERALISM, NEUTRALITY, AND RESOURCES 
Introductory Remarks 
The neutrality of the state is one of the main values for a liberal 
political order and we have seen this to mean that the purpose of govern- 
ment activity is to ensure for all persons a reasonable opportunity to pursue 
the good of their own choosing. The question that now has to be dealt 
with is how to create conditions of equal opportunity for people to choose 
any (permissible) conception of the good with a reasonable prospect of 
realizing that conception. 
Alexander and Schwarzschild (1987) have posed the question of what 
divides liberals if the neutrality principle is the principle that defines and 
unites them. They argue that there are two questions: 
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(1) What resources are up for "neutral" distribution? More specifically do those 
resources include or exclude persons' bodies, labor, and talents? . . . (2) What  is 
the proper formula for distributing those resources that are  up for distribution? 
(p 86) 
They deal in their article with only a part of the second issue. Their focus 
is on whether there is a neutral way resource holdings can be measured. 
Their conclusion is "that there is no neutral way of measuring resource 
holdings, and that such a conclusion seriously undermines liberalism to the 
extent liberalism rests on an abstract principle of neutrality" (p. 87). At 
the end of this section we return to their conclusion. First, however, we 
examine two resourcists' theories of distribution, within the framework of 
liberal neutrality. Both theories discuss what should be involved in allocat- 
ing resources in a neutral way and what would have to be done to create 
conditions of equal opportunity for all citizens to realize their views of the 
good. The theories that are examined are those of Rawls, with his proposal 
to equalize, as far as possible, the bundle of primary goods available to 
each person, and Dworkin, who argues that the ethically relevant equality 
must be that of equality of resources. Both Rawls and Dworkin have at- 
tempted to work out, with the idea of primary goods and that of equality 
of resources, a neutral theory of resource holdings. In fact, according to 
Alexander and Schwarzschild, Rawls (and Dworkin) are the only ones of 
contemporary liberal theorists who have done so. 
Rawls's Approach: Primary Goods 
Rawls's (1982) solution to the question of which resources are up for 
neutral distribution is the concept of primary goods: "social background 
conditions and all-purpose means generally necessary for forming and ra- 
tionally pursuing a conception of the good" (p. 169). These goods are 
"neutral" because they are goods any rational person would want more of 
rather than less, no matter what that person's view of the good was. The 
notion of primary goods addresses the moral and practical problem of how, 
given different and opposing, conceptions of the good, a public under- 
standing still could be possible. It is based on the idea that a partial 
similarity of citizen's conceptions of the good is sufficient for political and 
social justice (Rawls, 1982, p. 161). 
The primary goods consist of the basic liberties; freedom of move- 
ment and choice of occupation; powers and prerogatives of offices and 
positions of responsibility; income and wealth; and the social bases of self- 
respect (1982, p. 162; 1971, pp. 60-65). Well-being can be directly 
accommodated with the index of primary goods, because concentration  
bundles of primary goods gives an objective criterion of well-being. 
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This list of primary goods has been criticized by several theorist. 
Nagel (1975), for instance, has criticized Rawls's theory of justice on the 
ground that it purports to be neutral between different conceptions of the 
good, but, in fact, is not. 
It is a fundamental feature of RaMs' conception of the fairness of the original 
position that it should not permit he choice of principles to depend on a particular 
conception of the good over which the parties may differ. The construction does 
not, I think, accomplish this, and there are reasons to believe that it cannot be 
successfully carried out. Any hypothetical choice situation which requires agreement 
among the parties will have to impose strong restrictions on the grounds of choice, 
and these restrictions can be justified only in terms of a conception of the good. 
It is one of those cases in which there is no neutrality to be had, because neutrality 
needs as much justification as any other position. (pp. 8-9) 
That neutrality needs as much justification as any other position, is certainly 
correct. 1° If political liberalism with its conception of the comprehensive 
principle of neutrality is a response to the variety and contestedness of 
ideals of the good life, it certainly needs a justification that is itself neutral. 
However, in the "Political Neutrality and Freedom" section, it has been 
suggested how such a justification could be given. In the specific case of 
RaMs it is exactly his construction of "the original position" that is to be 
understood as a position of neutrality from which to derive principles of 
justice. It guarantees the wish to show everyone qual respect, understood 
as the equal freedom for each person to pursue his conception of the good. 
Nagel (1975) however, makes a more valid point when he remarks that 
"the primary goods are not equally valuable in pursuit of all conceptions of 
the good" (p. 9). They serve, according to Nagel, some individualist concep- 
tions well enough but "they are less useful in implementing nonindividualist 
conceptions." (See also Fishldn, 1975 and Schwartz, 1975. For a reaction to 
Nagel's 1975 critique by Rawls, see Rawls, 1988, p. 264, note 23.) 
This is a weaker criticism of the concept of primary goods then that 
formulated by Sen. As remarked earlier, objective criteria of well-being can 
be directly accommodated with the index of primary goods. Sen (1988) has 
stated that the focus on primary goods 
has an advantage arising from the fact that a person's actual freedom to lead a life 
does indeed depend fairly crucially on his or her holding of primary goods, and 
the index of primary goods can, to that extent, be seen as an index of freedom. (p. 
277) 
1°See Nagel's (1987) discussion of this problem. Ackerman (1963, p. 387) has argued "that it 
would be a categorical mistake to imagine that there could be a neutral justification." 
Larmore (1987) is however, as stated earlier, an attempt o give such a justification. He 
then, of course, disagrees with Nagel and Ackerman in this regard (Larmore, 1987, p. 161, 
note 11). See also Barry (1990b) where he argues that the principle of neutrality is not a 
very attractive principle, not even for liberals. 
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So, primary goods support freedom of choice. However, there is, as Sen 
notes, a problem. The advantages that persons possess are judged by ref- 
erence to the index of primary goods. This means, for instance, that ex- 
pensive tastes are not a ground for more income. This is justified, according 
to Rawls, because a person has responsibility for the choice of his own 
ends. This leads Sen (1982b) to raise the following question: 
But what about the cripple with utility disadvantage . . . .  The Difference Principle 
will give him neither more nor less on grounds of his being crippled. His utility 
disadvantage will be irrelevant o the Difference Principle. This may seem hard, 
and I think it is (p. 365) 11 
One should note here that Rawls justifies the omission of "hard cases" 
because he wants to postpone the question of how to deal with those cases 
rather than to ignore it. Problems of special health and medical needs are 
put, for the time being, aside by him. He assumes that "all citizens have 
physical and psychological capacities within a certain ormal range" (1982b, 
p. 168). 12 Sen quite rightly, I think, points out that differences of needs--of 
which hard cases are just extreme xamples--are p rvasive and deserve a
more central place in a theory of justice such as Rawls' (Sen, 1982b, p. 
366, note 28; 1989, p. 27, note 41). He concludes that leaving those cases 
out may guarantee that "mistakes" will be made (Sen, 1982a, p. 14; 1984, 
p. 320; 1988, p. 278). However, the problem does not end with hard cases. 
Sen (1982b) makes an even more important point: 
The primary goods approach seems to take little note of the diversity of human 
beings . . . .  If people were basically very similar, then an index of primary goods 
mights be quite a good way of judging advantage. But, in fact, people seem to have 
different needs varying with health, longevity, climatic conditions, location, work 
conditions, temperament, and even body size (affecting food and clothing require- 
ments). So what is involved is not merely ignoring a few hard cases, but overlooking 
very widespread and real differences. Judging advantage purely in terms of primary 
goods leads to a partially blind morality. (p. 366) 
The interpersonal variations, even when they are exceptional, may call for 
urgent attention, since they may relate to especially important problems, 
e.g., the freedom of the disabled people to move about freely and to take 
part in the life of the community (Sen, 1988, p. 278). There are, Sen con- 
cludes: "widespread and ubiquitous variations in our ability to convert pri- 
mary goods into functionings and well-beings" (p. 278). Although RawIs's 
11Alexander and Schwarzschild (1987) formulate the same kind of critique against Rawls's 
conception of primary goods: "most importantly for our purpose, Rawls's primary goods 
arbitrarily leave out of consideration abnormal needs and handicaps" (p. 89). 
12This of course does not mean that the hard cases are unimportant for Rawls. But he thinks 
that health and medical needs of citizens "can be decided at the legislative stage in the light 
of existing social conditions and reasonable xpectations of the frequency of illness and 
accident" (1982, p. 168). 
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approach of the holdings of primary goods provides a view of freedom of 
choice, he has fallen, according to Sen (1982b), into the trap of "commodity 
fetishism," in which goods are regarded as valuable in themselves, and not 
for the benefits they bestow upon the person "RaMs takes primary goods 
as the embodiment of advantage rather than taking advantage to be a re- 
lationship between persons and goods" (p. 366). The problem with Rawls's 
conception of primary goods is that they are only seen as means to ends. 
Although the focus on the index of primary goods can be seen in some 
respects as an index of freedom, this index pays no attention to the diversity 
of human beings in terms of special health and other needs. Primary goods 
suffer from the "fetishist" handicap of being concerned with goods rather 
than what these good things do to human beings. In that sense primary 
goods do not reflect sufficiently each person's freedom of choice to achieve 
valuable functioning and well-being equally. (See on "commodity fetishism" 
in general: Sen, 1985b, p. 28. In relation to Rawls's primary goods, see also 
Sen, 1982b, p. 366). 
Rawls (1988) has responded to the critique formulated by Sen 
(1982b). He summarizes his interpretation f Sen's objection in the follow- 
ing way: 
[T]he idea of primary goods must be mistaken. For they are not what, from within 
anyone's comprehensive doctrine, can be taken as ultimately important: they are 
not, in general, anyone's idea of the basic values of human life. Therefore, to focus 
on primary goods, one may object, is to work for the most part in the wrong 
space--in the space of institutional features and material things and not in the 
space of basic moral values. (pp. 258-259) 
Rawls's (1988) response to his interpretation of Sen's objection is the fol- 
lowing: "In reply, an index of primary goods is not intended as an approxi- 
mation to what is ultimately important as specified by any particular 
comprehensive doctrine with its account of moral values" (p. 259). How- 
ever, this reply of Rawls seems to miss the point Sen was trying to make, 
as Sen (1989, pp. 27-34) has noted. Evaluation of capability need not be 
based on one particular comprehensive doctrine: Capability reflects a per- 
son's freedom to choose between alternative lives. The point is that disad- 
vantaged persons may get less from primary goods. As Sen remarks: "Rawls 
is right to think that my objection did relate to primary goods being means 
only, but that problem is not disposed of by saying that they are not meant 
as an approximation of any particular comprehensive doctrine" (1989, pp. 
30-31; 1990, p. 119). Rawls stresses the function that primary goods play 
in assuring that the different conceptions of the good people have can, in 
practice, be realized. Although he is sympathetic to this inter-end variation, 
Sen is more concerned with inter-individual variation in the relationship 
between resources and the freedom to pursue ends. It is this diversity, the 
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variations between people in their ability to convert resources into actual 
freedoms, that Sen (1990) tries to capture with his concept of capabilities. 
Rawls's theory may be interpreted as formulating a defense for a com- 
prehensive principle of neutrality whose implementation would guarantee 
that each citizen has an equal opportunity to pursue in their lives any ideal 
of the good of their own choosing. However, especially with the help of 
Sen's arguments, we now have seen that Rawls's solution to thequestion 
of which resources are up for neutral distribution is inadequate. We shall 
have to look for another solution to the question of which resources are 
up for neutral distribution. 
Dworkin's Approach: Equality of Resources 
The critique of Rawls's primary goods approach may lead to the idea 
that, when searching for a solution to the question of which resources are 
up for neutral distribution, what we really are concerned with are levels of 
welfare, not of income, wealth, or such in their own right. 
Dworkin (1981a) has thoroughly criticized the idea that it is welfare 
that liberal principles of justice should be concerned with distributing. He 
considers 
two general theories of distributional equality. The first (which I shall call equality 
of welfare) holds that a distributional scheme treats people as equals when it dis- 
tributes or transfers resources among them until no further transfer would leave 
them more equal welfare. (p. 186) 
After various arguments DworkJn concludes that equality of welfare is not 
so coherent or attractive an ideal as it is often taken to be. Equality of 
welfare, taken to be a theory about treating people as equals, turns out to 
be weaker than one may have initially thought. One of the main objections 
Dworkin makes against welfare equalitarianism is that people have incom- 
mensurable conceptions of welfare, conceptions so different hat it is mean- 
ingless to compare the welfare of different people. This means that no 
theory of equality of welfare is consistent with the demands of liberalism 
for neutrality among conceptions of the good. Equality of welfare is, there- 
fore, according to Dworkin not a desirable political goal. 
Instead Dworkin (1981a) offers equality of resources as the adequate 
resourcist heory of distributive justice. This second theory "holds that it 
treats people as equals when it distributes or transfers o that no further 
transfer would leave their shares of the total resources more equal" (p. 
186). With equality-of-welfare ethics, resources are redistributed to equalize 
welfare. In the case of equality-of-resource ethics one redistributes re- 
sources equally, not, as Roemer (1985) has pointed out 
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without any regard to welfare, but because we are motivated to improve, at least 
somewhat, he welfare of those who began with few resources. We wish to start 
people from a position of equal resource opportunities, not for the sake of some 
abstract symmetry, but because this will improve the welfare of those who otherwise 
would have been relatively lacking in resources. (p. 173) 
For Dworkin resources are defined broadly, as they include not only alien- 
able assets but also nontransferable ones of various kinds (talents, handi- 
caps, and various inborn propensities) which a person cannot be deemed 
responsible for having. 
Much of this argument is concerned with what equality of resources 
might really mean and Dworkin argues that the idea involves both the op- 
eration of an economic market and the assumption of the existence of some 
insurance markets covering differences of abilities and productive power 
to make the equality of resources a persuasive moral criterion. 
In several powerful critiques of Dworkin's project, a number of theo- 
rists have shown it to be a failure. Roemer (1985, p. 172), for instance, 
has argued that equality of resources worsens the welfare of the resource- 
poor. If equalizing resources i designed to improve the welfare of those 
who are resource-poor initially, then of course it cannot be a plausible al- 
ternative to equality of welfare. Roemer (1985, p. 156) shows that there is 
no acceptable conception of resource galitarianism that does not reduce 
to recommending equality of welfare. And if, Roemer argues, equality of 
welfare is impossible under the constraint of liberal neutrality (which was 
Dworkin's objection against welfare galitarianism), then so is any plausible 
equality of resources (see Roemer, 1985, pp. 177-178, 1986; Varian, 1985; 
Scanlon, 1986; Arneson, 1989). 
Alexander and Schwarzschild (1987) for their part, argue that Dworkin 
"is caught between an intuitively unattractive rsion of equality of resources 
that excludes consideration of special needs and handicaps, and a version 
that is more appealing but that collapses into equality of welfare" (p. 103). 
Like Roemer, they conclude that Dwor'rdn's replacement of equality-of-wel- 
fare with resources i a failure. At the same time they agree with Dworkin's 
critique of equality-of-welfare theories: none of those is consistent with the 
demands of liberalism for neutrality among conceptions of the good. 
Finally, Sen rejects Dworkin's focus on equality of resources. This is 
mainly due to the fact that Dworkin argues against bringing in handicaps 
into the idea of equality of resources as such (Sen, 1984, p. 321). In fact, 
Sen (1984) repeats the critique against Dworkin that he formulated against 
Rawls's idea of primary goods. Dworkin underestimates the general nature 
of the problem of the interpersonal differences: 
depending on our body size, metabolism, temperament, social conditions, etc., the 
translation of resources into he abiIity to do things does vary substantially from 
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person to person and from community o community, and to ignore that is to miss 
out on an important general dimension of moral concern. (p. 323) 
We have to reach, I think, the same conclusion as in Rawls's case. 
Dworkin's solution to the problem of making the comprehensive principle 
of neutrality a working principle must be considered a failure. 
Liberalism, Neutrality, Primary Goods, and Equality of Resources 
In the foregoing we have seen that, with regard to which resources 
are up for neutral distribution, the approaches of both Rawls, and Dworkin 
are inadequate. Their solutions are inconsistent with liberalism's demand 
for neutrality among different conceptions of the good citizens have. 
Alexander and Schwarzschild (1987) come to the same conclusion. 
They started their analysis with the remark "that only Rawls and Dworkin 
have attempted to work out" such a neutral theory (p. 88, italics added). 
It can come as no surprise then that they conclude at the end of their 
article that the failure of both theories 
leaves liberalism with only one remaining option. It must reject neutrality as a fun- 
damental principle. Liberalism must be defended, not as a theory morally prior to 
any theory of the good, but as a component of such a theory, or as one value or 
set of values among a large set (p. 109). 
Their conclusion should however be rejected. The comprehensive principle 
of neutrality, with its lexical priority of government activity to ensure for 
all persons a reasonable opportunity to pursue their own conceptions of 
the good, should still be defended. One good reason for this defense is 
that, contrary to what Alexander and Schwarzschild think, not only Rawls 
and Dworkin have attempted to work out a neutral theory of resource hold- 
ings but that there is at least one other theory that has also made the 
attempt. It is argued in the following that, unlike Rawls's and Dworkin's 
theories, it does not fail. This is the approach developed by Sen. 
Sen's Approach: Basic Capabilities 
Sen criticizes Rawls's approach of primary goods because Rawls does 
not cope in any effective way with the problem of the fundamental diversity 
of human beings (Sen, 1982b, p. 357). 
As stated earlier, the availability of an adequate range of options de- 
fives its value from the contribution it makes to the equal freedom of each 
person to lead a good life of his own choice. The freedom to choose be- 
tween alternative conceptions of the good and political neutrality go hand 
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in hand. In this perspective the recognition of the fundamental diversity of 
human beings has very deep consequences (Sen, 1982b, p. 321). 
Sen (1988) stresses this point in the following way: 
A theory of freedom has to come to grips with the enormous heterogeneity of 
human beings in terms of personal, social and natural characteristics. The crucial 
issue in identifying the nature of'freedom of choice' relates to the question: Choice 
of what? (p. 278) 
The Rawlsian (and for that matter Dworkinian) notions are, according to 
Sen (1984), "moves in the right direction, but they seem to me to be gen- 
erally deficient as moral criteria, and in particular take inadequate note of 
the ideas behind positive freedom" (p. 323). What is especially missing in 
both approaches i what Sen calls, some notion of "basic capabilities": a 
person's ability to do certain things. This concern with positive freedoms 
leads directly to valuing people's capabilities and those things that would 
serve to enhance those capabilities. The notion of capabilities relates, Sen 
remarks, closely to the functioning of a personJ 3Or, as he has formulated 
it more recently: 
If the positive conception of freedom is to reflect our ability to achieve valuable 
functioning and well-being, then there is clearly a case for viewing this freedom in 
terms of alternative bundles of functioning that a person may be able to achieve. 
(Sen, 1988, p. 278) 
One instance is the ability to move about effectively; but one can consider 
other abilities, for instance, "the ability to meet one's nutritional require- 
ments, the wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered, the power to partici- 
pate in the social life of the community" (Sen, 1982b, p. 367). To argue 
that resources should be devoted to remove or substantially reduce the 
handicap of the cripple despite there being no primary good deprivation, 
the case must rest on the interpretation of needs in the form of basic ca- 
pabilities. That is the solution to the lack of freedom to choose various 
functionings. The freedom to choose between alternative functioning bun- 
dles reflects a person's advantage: his or her capability' "to function" (Sen, 
1988, p. 279). This interpretation of needs and interests is often implicit 
in the demand for equality. This is what Sen defines as "basic capability 
equality" (Sen, 1982b, p. 368). 
This focus by Sen on basic capabilities (1982b) can be seen "as a 
natural extension of Rawls's concern with primary goods, shifting attention 
from goods to what goods do to human beings" (p. 368). In the same way 
there is a congruence between the requirement of equality of capabilities 
and that of equality of resources, but here the problem is, as Sen notes, 
13See Sen (1982 b, pp. 367-368); (1984, p. 324)° See also for the link between th  capabilities 
approach and the ideal of positive freedom: Sen (1985 a, p. 201). 
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that Dworkin argues against bringing handicaps into the idea of equality 
of resources as such (Sen, 1984, p. 321). 
To be in favor of the principle that there should be equal freedom 
to choose between alternative conceptions of the good life involves acknow- 
ledging that capability to function comes closest to this conception of 
freedom. If this freedom is valued then capability itself should serve as an 
object of value and moral importance, because capabilities specify what a 
person can or cannot do, or can or cannot be.  14 In the context of our dis- 
cussion of neutral theories of resource holdings we conclude that Sen's idea 
of basic capabilities i an approach that solves liberalism's demand for neu- 
trality among the different conceptions of the good citizens have. (It should 
be pointed out that in his discussion of the shortcomings of primary goods 
and equality of resources, and in formulating his own conception of basic 
capabilities, Sen nowhere himself places this discussion in the context of 
the debate of liberalism, conceived as political neutrality. However, as 
should be clear from the discussion in my article, Sen's theory of basic 
capabilities can be accommodated within this debate). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: A DEFENSE OF NEUTRALITY 
In this article liberalism has been defined as a theory in which one 
of the main values of the liberal political order is the neutrality of the 
state. Given the plurality of conceptions of the good, the government 
should be neutral between these conceptions. In fact, the comprehensive 
principle of neutrality formulates one of the main goals of governmental 
authority, with lexical priority over other tasks: ensuring for all persons a 
reasonable opportunity to pursue the good of their own choosing. 
The justification of political neutrality has been based on the desire 
to show everyone equal concern and respect. Equal freedom of choice can 
be guaranteed by this principle of neutrality. In that sense freedom and 
neutrality are closely connected. 
Assuming moral pluralism, Rawls looks for a basis of agreement other 
than that of a general and comprehensive doctrine. He stresses the impor- 
tant public role a neutrally recognized political conception of justice has 
to play. His suggestion is that his own conception, that of justice as fairness, 
14See Sen (1984), pp. 315-316). See also Sen (1989) where he, once again, formulates his 
main ideas on basic capabilities. See also Arnesho (1987) who remarks in regard to the 
three resourcist approaches, those of RaMs, Dworkin, and Sen, that "Sen's emphasis on 
capabilities i perhaps the most plausible because people vary greatly in the rates at which 
they transform resources into capabilities and surely we care about resource shares because 
we care what people can do with their resource shares" (1987, p. 531). 
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can play such a role. This conception is intended to solve the question of 
how to regulate the terms of social cooperation between citizens in such 
a way that each will have the equal ability to pursue his own conception 
of the good. 
The communitarian, onliberal, view is that the political order must 
subordinate justice to a higher, more substantive, ideal than the conceptions 
of the good citizens have. It may be contrasted with liberalism as neutrality. 
Sandel, a typical example of this line of thought, criticizes Rawls's theory 
for formulating an abstract conception of justice that does not presuppose 
any conception of the good life, and that sees the self only in disencum- 
bered terms. An ideal of what we should be as persons can only be 
connected with a conception of the political order when it is expressed in 
the primary ideals of that order. 
However Rawls's position can be defended against such an attack be- 
cause communitarian ideas like those of Sandel make freedom, the freedom 
of choice of one's own conception of the good, impossible. A conception 
of the good can be imposed upon us by the community. The equal oppor- 
tunity to pursue in one's life an ideal of the good of one's own choosing 
implies the rejection of the idea that he state should be seen as a com- 
munity. The comprehensive principle of neutrality may be strongly 
defended against communitarian attacks. 
When we came to the question how to create conditions of equal op- 
portunity for people to choose any conception of the good with a 
reasonable opportunity of realizing that conception, we examined Rawls's 
conception of primary goods. We reached the conclusion that his answer 
created some problems. This should not lead us, however, to abandon the 
search for conditions of equal opportunity for people to choose a concep- 
tion of the good, or even to lead us to abandon, more generally, political 
liberalism understood as neutrality, a5 Sen's capability approach is a more 
satisfactory solution to the question of what conditions create neutrality. 
In this regard it should be noted that, for instance, Arneson (1987) 
has suggested that Sen's capability approach has, in fact, a perfectionist 
component. His problem with Sen's approach is that 
opportunities themselves must be measured and a welfarist will insist that the 
proper measure of an individual's opportunities i that ~ndividual's valuation of 
15See also Jones (1989), who takes a stand against hose who think that "liberalism both is 
and should be founded upon a theory of the good. There are also many others (myself 
included) who still hope that something approximating to the neutralist position can be 
sustained for, if liberals have ultimately to accept hat they, no less than their opponents, 
seek merely to impose a favored form of life upon others, liberalism will have lost much 
of its distinctiveness and appeal" (p. 34). See also Barry (1990b) for an argument in which 
doubt is raised about the usefulness of the neutralist position in arguing for liberal 
institutions. 
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them. Opportunities should be measured as opportunities for welfare or preference 
satisfaction. I sofar as Sen's capabilities approach holds that opportunities can b  
measured independently (or partly independently) of welfare, there is a perfectionist 
component tohis approach. (p. 532, note 24) 
However, this line of reasoning seems to me to be incorrect. The fact that 
Sen's "capabilities" can be measured in an objective way, does not imply 
perfectionism. It only means there is an objective standard for measuring 
instrumental resources that are means to ends. (Following Arneson's rea- 
soning, Rawls's conception of primary goods would also lead us to the con- 
clusion that it was a perfectionist approach.) Sen himself distinguishes 
between "self-evaluation" and "standard-evaluation." What is relevant here 
is that the capability approach has to do with self-evaluation: It tells us 
what the person would judge to be his standard of living in comparison 
with other positions (Sen, 1987, p. 30). 
Our general conclusion is, then, that if one favors freedom of choice, 
one should defend the comprehensive principle of neutrality with its lexical 
priority for government to create the equal opportunity to advance any 
permissible conception of the good. That would create a truly liberal po- 
litical order. 
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APPENDIX A 
For a fundamental misunderstanding of the liberal notion of neutral- 
ity of the state, see Mouffe (1988), where it is stated: 
Unfortunately too many liberals want o identify political liberalism with the neutral 
state and do not understand that it is a mistaken and self-defecting strategy. Some 
like Charles Larmore even argue that the task of liberal theory is to provide a 
neutral justification of the neutrality of the state. (p. 112) 
This neutrality is interpreted by Mouffe to imply that "neutral experts" 
take over political decisions and that, in general those decisions are defined 
as "administrative and technical" ones. To be sure this is not  what Larmore 
understands to be the meaning of the liberal notion of neutrality. The mis- 
understanding becomes even clearer when Mouffe continues with the re- 
mark: "To be sure Rawls does not endorse those claims to neutrality and 
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• . .  his theory of justice is getting increasingly loaded with values" (p. 112). 
Indeed, Rawls does not endorse "those claims to neutrality," but neither 
does Larmore. 
APPENDIX  B 
One may wonder if one can fairly attack Sandet's interpretation of 
Rawls's theory as formulated in hisA Theory of Justice (1971), with thoughts 
Rawts has published only after Sandel published his book in 1982. The 
answer is that, first of all, A Theory of Justice already harbors both the 
Kantian and the modus vivendi view. Second, Sandel acknowledges in his 
book Rawts's "Kantian Construcfivism in Moral Theory" published 2 years 
before Sandel published his book (Rawls, 1980). This, according to Wal- 
lach, tends "to place Sandel's book qua Rawlsian critique in the category 
of interesting misreadings of A Theory of Justice" (1987, pp. 608-609, note 
7). See also Rorty on Sandel's (mis)interpretation f Rawls's view here 
Rorty rebuts some of the objections to Rawls Sandel formulates (Rorty, 
1988, pp. 264-268). Finally one could quote Gutmann (1985): 
Someone might reasonably argue that not until "The Dewey Lectures" does Rawls 
consistently and clearly defend the position on justification that I attribute to him 
(the modus vivendi view, P.B.L.). Had Sandel directed his criticism only against A
Theory of Justice, his interpretation would have been more credible. But he still 
could not have sustained his central claim that Rawls's principles and liberalism 
more generally must rest on implausible metaethical grounds. (p. 312, note 18) 
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